UN Paperclips for Somalia

Emeritus Professor of Anthropology
London School of Economics
18 January, 2001

Mr David Stephen’s press release on Somalia (11 January 2001) lacks serious
analysis of the current political dynamics of the country. Progress has been made in Somalia, he claims. Yes, indeed. But hardly as a result of UN initiative, and particularly not due to the ‘Arta peace process’. As Mr Stephen(the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative) neglects to mention, but as everyone with any familiarity with the actual situation knows, the greatest progress in rebuilding civil society has been achieved in the breakaway Republic of Somaliland and in the locally autonomous state of Puntland. In these two cases, standards of social service provision and of representative government, though by no means perfect, far exceed what was achieved under the repressive dictatorship of General Mohamed Siyad Barre(in which the leaders of the Arta faction served) and are to some extent superior even to that of earlier civilian regimes(which I knew well). We live in an era of liberation and self-determination where such spontaneous local achievements should be cherished and encouraged, particularly, one would expect, by the international community. Whatever may have been acceptable in the colonial period, it is not the business, of any UN official, to make judgements which, in effect, dictate to Somalis how they should identify or govern themselves. At least the EU had the good sense to seek to build upon the local Somali political units which are now forming spontaneously rather than to foster grandiose efforts to re-impose an archaic colonial structure that failed conspicuously to deliver ‘good government’ in the past. All those who have the interests of the Somali people at heart(and by no means all Somali politicians have that!) should endeavour to understand how progress in Somaliland and Puntland has been achieved and how their successes might be replicated in the troubled south. By the same token, if the Italian ambassador spent more time studying these achievements rather than in patronisingly urging northern leaders to recognise Abdulqasim he might be in a position to make a more useful contribution to Somali affairs. Far from being ‘based on the clan elders’ as Mr Stephen blandly states, the ‘Arta process in Djibouti’ embraced a wide range of participants including a number of notorious warlords and even ‘street boys’ recruited from Djibouti town to swell the numbers. Many genuine leaders and representatives, including those in Somaliland and Puntland(where the local elders have actually played a crucial role in peace-making and government)—as well as the principal despotic warlords in Mogadishu—chose to boycott the proceedings which, therefore, cannot obviously be described as nationally inclusive. This, naturally, restricts the validity of any decisions taken in Arta which are, in any case, of dubious constitutional legality. The Arta conference outcome, the self-styled ‘transitional national government’ is consequently, a tenuous minority enterprise, very far from enjoying the degree of national support inside Somalia which Mr Stephen claims, and hence appropriately lacking the international backing the Special Representative misleadingly reports. As every Somali knows, Mr Abdulqasim’s ‘government’ is indeed so unwelcome in Mogadishu that, despite the assistance of some of his local business cronies, its members have to shelter like prisoners in heavily guarded hotels. They cannot even utilise the clan’s Habar Ghidir airport outside the city without expensive militia escorts .It is hardly surprising that, consequently, despite the difficulties and expense of getting out, there should be a steady seepage of his assemblymen, and even some ministers, defecting to their home regions or elsewhere. Who can blame them. The main current focus of conflict is ,however, in the Rahanwin region which, prior to Arta, was developing local autonomy along the lines of Puntland.. This in part reflects the fact that although Mr Stephen’s proteges agreed to establish their new ‘government’’s headquarters in the Rahanwin centre of Baidoa, they cavalierly reneged on this agreement and, in bad faith, sought to insert themselves amongst Abdulqasim’s own clansmen in Mogadishu. Mr Stephen speaks rather grandly of ‘federalism’—but the actual public statements of Mr Abdulqasim and his ministers have, on the contrary, emphasised their commitment to a unitary state which would incorporate Somaliland and Puntland whatever the wishes of the citizens there. This hardly augurs well for the ‘peace process’ (an empty piece of rhetoric) ‘reaching out’ successfully to embrace those communities. Here, again, we see how this premature and poorly thought-out UN ‘peace-building’ initiative is already proving counter-productive. It is not only contributing directly to the deteriorating security situation in southern Somalia, but also—and very understandably in the light of Abdulqasim’s and his associates’ involvement in Siyad’s brutal military suppression of the north—in reinforcing local nationalism in Somaliland and Puntland. The most pressing problem is as usual, of course, in Mogadishu itself, now dominated by the Habar Ghidir invaders who overthrew Siyad and seized most of the property that is worth seizing (including women from minority groups). Mr Stephen speaks of the lack of ‘land writs’, presumably meaning written titles to property. Actually, this is one of the most explosive of all issues in the south and can only begin to be addressed in the context of a general political settlement amongst all the factions in the city(including Abdulqasim’s). Some of those who hold this stolen property, and who will not readily release it, are reportedly merchants whose opportunistic support for Abdulqasim is based on understandings that in return for their backing they can continue to hold what they have seized. The notion that written documents are all that is needed to resolve these issues is simplistic: those who illegally hold property will quickly manufacture documents to authorise their holdings. Indeed, earlier land registration programmes in southern Somalia resulted in most cases in powerful urban interests grabbing land from impoverished owners. These problems cannot be effectively dealt with piecemeal. They require a general political settlement in Mogadishu which could only hope to succeed if it demonstrated that it would actually be to the benefit of all the parties there to share (e.g. through tax apportionment) the resources(airport and port etc) which they currently control separately. Unfortunately, there is so far no indication that, despite the commercial interests which bind their leaders, Abdulqasim’s ‘transitionals’ possess the authority and influence to achieve this first step towards order and rehabilitation in Mogadishu. Whatever the Italian foreign office may imagine, in the wider Somali view(which is rather more important), it is only when these local issues are resolved that Mogadishu will have any legitimate claim to serve again as a Somali capital. In the meantime, environmental abuse and illegal fishing along the Somali coast are topics where imaginative UN action could actually be of some use. Other than that, on current performance, rather than meddling in Somalia’s internal politics, perhaps the UN should limit its no doubt well-intentioned efforts to remedying the bureaucrat’s nightmare highlighted by Mr Stephen—the absence of paper-clips!

I.M. Lewis
London School of Economics
18 January 2001